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ABSTRACT 
A  wireless  sensor  network  is  a  collection  of  nodes  organized  in  to  a  cooperative  network.  Each  node 
consists of processing capability, multiple types of memory, a power source and actuators and sensors. This 
wireless sensor network is established in hostile and harsh environments like civil and military applications. 
This network is prone to various attacks. One of the major attack is clone attack. An adversary can capture 
the node and replicate the node including its cryptographic information and deploy these  nodes in the 
network. This will lead to several problems like leaking the data, jamming the data flow, injecting false data 
etc. The RED protocol determined the witness node using pseudo-randomly but it is purely static. This 
study proposes eXtended-Randomized, Efficient, Distributed (X-RED), which detects clone nodes in the 
static wireless sensor networks in a dynamically fast manner. It is a distributed protocol, which computes 
the witness nodes dynamically. There is no pre-assumption in determining the witness node. We show that 
the protocol satisfies the major requirements of the distributed algorithms like the witness node is selected 
based on their id and location and also reduce the overhead. Simulation results show that our protocol is 
more  efficient  than  other  exiting  protocols  in  terms  of  detection  probability.  This  approach  gives 
considerable amount of increase in detection probability than other existing protocols and also reduces the 
storage overhead. This study can be extended for mobile wireless network in the future. 
 
Keywords: Attacks,  Authentication,  Clone  Node,  Detection  Probability,  Direction,  Hash  Function, 
Incoherent Location, Malicious Node, Storage Overhead, Wireless Sensor Network 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor network is a network of sensor nodes, 
which  are  tiny  with  limited  resources  that  communicate 
with  each  other  to  achieve  a  goal,  through  the  wireless 
channels.  This  network  is  mainly  used  in  military 
applications for monitoring security and in civil applications 
(Akyildiz et al., 2002). This network is deployed in harsh 
and hostile environments. Based on the operating nature, it 
is unattended and prone to various attacks. 
One of the common attacks is clone attack or replication 
attack, where an adversary node captures some nodes and 
makes duplicates of the original node and thus inserts these 
duplicates in the network. These duplicates use the same 
node Identifier (ID) as the original node in the network. 
Thus  it  takes  full  control  over  the  network  (Lupu  and 
Parvan, 2009). The consequence of this attack is injecting 
false  data,  modifying  the  data,  initiating  a  warm-whole 
attack and dropping packets. Thus all these result in leaking 
of authorized data to an adversary. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Several algorithms were developed so far to detect clone 
attacks in both static and mobile sensor networks. In this 
study  we  propose  an  algorithm  which  is  randomized, 
distributed  and  dynamically  detect  the  clone  nodes  and 
analyses the performances of the existing protocols LSM Geetha, C. and M. Ramakrishnan / Journal of Computer Science 10 (10): 1900-1907, 2014 
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and  RED  in  terms  of  detection  probability  and 
communication overhead (memory occupation). 
The main requirements of the distributed algorithm 
are discussed in (Conti et al., 2006): 
 
·  Witness node selection: The witness node may be 
selected  randomly  or  pseudo-randomly  in  the 
distributed  network.  To  predict  the  witness  node, 
either the id or the location is used 
·  Overhead:  Since  the  sensor  network  is  resource-
constrained, the overhead in  message transmission 
should be avoided 
 
For an efficient algorithm, it should be distributed in 
nature  and  should  select  the  witness  node  so  as  to 
minimize  communication  cost  and  increases  the 
detection probability (Conti et al., 2007). 
The  remaining  part  of  this  study  is  organized  as 
follows: Section 3 reviews the existing protocols. Section 
4  explains  the  network  model,  assumptions  and  the 
notations  used.  Section  5  introduces  the  proposed 
system.  Section  5  shows  the  simulation  results  and 
analyses the results of other existing protocols. Section 6 
concludes this study. 
3. RELATED WORKS 
The first solution for clone detection is centralized one 
based  on  the  Base  Station.  Each  node  sends  the  id  and 
location information to the Base Station (Xing et al., 2008). 
From  the  same  id,  if  location  information  is  received  is 
different, clone node is detected (Zhu et al., 2012). But this 
scheme has drawbacks as lot of message transmission and 
single point of failure. Also the nodes which are located 
closer  to  BS  have  to  transmit  lot  of  messages  and  thus 
reduce the operational life of these nodes. 
Another centralized approach is, each node is having 
a  set  of  symmetric  keys  which  are  selected  randomly 
from a large pool. Each node counts the number of times 
that key is (Eschenauer and Gligor, 2002) used for its 
communication (Brooks et al., 2007; Chan et al., 2003). 
Each node sends its count to BS. From this count, the BS 
identifies  the  clone  node  in  network.  The  node  which 
uses the keys  too often are  considered cloned and the 
revocation procedure is invoked. 
The  two  main  protocols  appeared  in  (Parno  et  al., 
2005)  are  distributed  solutions.  The  first  scheme, 
Randomized  Multicast  (RM),  sends  the  information 
about its location to direct neighbors and in turn each of 
these  neighbors  sends  this  information  to  randomly 
selected witnesses. If there is a replicated node, any one 
of this witness may receive the different location claims 
with  same  ID  and  it  revokes  the  replicated  node.  The 
advantage is high detection probability using relatively 
limited number of witnesses. The number of messages 
send by each neighbor is Ön. 
The second scheme, Line Selected Multicast (LSM), 
uses  the  routing  information  to  detect  the  clones.  In 
addition  to  the  witness  nodes,  the  intermediate  nodes 
within the path can check for clones as shown in Fig. 1. 
Each node forwards the claims and saves the claims. For 
example, a node a and clone a’ in the network. Neighbor 
of a sends the location claim to r witnesses. Each node 
stores  this  information  also.  When  this  information  is 
transferred on the path any node w verifies the signature 
on the claim and checks for the conflict with the location 
information on its buffer. If there is a conflict it revokes 
the cloned node. Otherwise store the claim and forwards 
to the next node. The advantage is less communication 
cost, high detection rate and less storage requirements. 
Zhu et al. (2007), two  more schemes are proposed 
which  are  Single  Deterministic  Cell  and  Parallel 
Multiple  Probabilistic  Cells.  In  the  first  scheme,  each 
node  ID  is  associated  with  a  single  cell.  The  location 
information is send to the predefined witness node within 
a cell. Once the witness node receives the message, it is 
broadcasted  to  all  other  nodes  in  the  cell.  In  second 
scheme, A number of witnesses are determined and it is 
already  defined.  The  neighbors  of  a  node  a  send  a’s 
claim  to  these  witness  nodes  with  a  probability.  This 
solution shows a high detection probability. 
Another protocol for detecting node replication attack 
is  SET  proposed  in  (Choi  et  al.,  2007).  A  number  is 
generated randomly and it is sent to all nodes and it is 
used to form disjoint set of clusters and cluster heads. 
Each cluster is considered as a set and heads of these 
clusters become leaders of these sets. Within each cluster 
one or more trees are defined over the network graph. A 
protocol  is  used  to  collect  all  the  nodes  belonging  to 
these subsets. If different subsets are having the same ID 
then there is a clone. 
The  RED  protocol  is  similar  to the  RM  protocol 
but  with  witnesses  chosen  based  on  pseudo-random 
function based on a random value. A random value, 
rand,  is  generated  and  distributed  to  all  the  nodes 
using a centralized mechanism. Each node broadcasts 
a message which contains encrypted ID and location 
information. The neighbors of source node sends (with 
probability p) this encrypted message to a set of g > = 
1 nodes which are selected using some pseudo-random 
function (Conti et al., 2011).  Geetha, C. and M. Ramakrishnan / Journal of Computer Science 10 (10): 1900-1907, 2014 
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Fig. 1. LSM approach 
 
The  disadvantage  of  the  RED  protocol  are  number  of 
messages  transmitted  high,  computation  time  is  high, 
witness node is static what we fix as g = 1, g> = 1 etc. 
and is location dependent. 
4. NETWORK MODEL AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
In this study, we assume nodes are static, non-tamper 
resistant  and  are  uniformly  deployed  in  the  area  of 
observation.  We  also  assume  that  communication  links 
between sensor nodes are bidirectional (Yu et al., 2009) 
and there is no centralized trusted entity in sensor network. 
Also  nodes  are  assigned  with  a  unique  ID  (Jian  et  al., 
2012), prior to their deployment. Assumptions made about 
the adversary are, an adversary can compromise only a 
limited  number  of  nodes,  an  adversary  can  take  full 
control  over  the  compromised  node,  an  adversary  can 
create as many replicas as adversary wishes to deploy into 
the network and an adversary cannot create a new ID for 
sensor node (Ho et al., 2009). 
4.1. Key Generation 
It  provides  authentication  to  node  in  a  network  to 
give  security.  Algorithm  used  to  generate  key  is  RSA 
algorithm. The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm 
is  one  of  the  most  popular  and  secures  public-key 
encryption methods (Rivest et al., 1978). The algorithm 
capitalizes on the fact that there is no efficient way to 
factor very large (100-200 digit) numbers. 
Using  an  encryption  key  (e,n),  the  algorithm  is  as 
follows: Represent the message as an integer between 0 
and  (n-1).  Large  messages  can  be  broken  up  into  a 
number of blocks. Each block would then be represented 
by an integer in the same range. Encrypt the message by 
raising  it  to  the  eth  power  modulo  n.  The  result  is  a 
cipher text message C. To decrypt cipher text message C, 
raise it to another power d modulo n. The encryption key 
(e,n) is  made public. The decryption key (d,n) is kept 
private by the user. 
4.2. Prediction 
Two types of prediction used in our schemes are 
ID  information  and  Location  information.  This 
protocol does not provide any information about ID of 
the  witness  nodes  during  the  next  iteration  of  the 
protocol and also the probability that the witness node 
selection  is  not  depending  on  the  location  of  that 
node.  Our  protocol  uses  both  ID  and  location 
information to detect replica in the network. 
4.3. Notation  
For  clarity,  we  list  the  symbols  and  notation  used 
throughout the paper in Table 1. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A  source  node  sends  the  location  information  to 
the  neighbor  node  which  is  located  from  a  random 
direction.  This  neighbor  node  uses  randomly/hash 
function  computation,  computes  a  diameter.  All  the 
nodes  within  the  circle  whose  diameter  is  d,  will 
receive  the  location  information  and  compares.  The 
node within the circle and at the edge or boundary in 
the  same  direction  becomes  the  witness  node.  From 
this node the location information is forwarded to a 
node  in  randomly  selected  direction.  The  proposed 
system architecture is given in the Fig. 2. Geetha, C. and M. Ramakrishnan / Journal of Computer Science 10 (10): 1900-1907, 2014 
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Fig. 2. Proposed system architecture 
 
Table 1. Notations used   
Variables  Definition 
n  Number of nodes in the network 
Ka
priv  a’s private key 
dir  Direction chosen by the source node 
EM  a’s signature on M (Encrypted Message) 
α  Witness node 
IDa  Node identifier of sensor node a 
Loca  Location of Node a 
 
In  the  RED  protocol  the  witness  node  selection  is 
performed based on the pseudo-random function and it is 
purely  static.  But  our  proposed  approach  selects  the 
witness  node  dynamically  and  randomly  in  every 
iteration. There is no pre-computation. 
5.1. X-RED Protocol  
The proposed protocol is executed as given: The node 
a  and  a’  send  the  location  and  ID  information  to  a 
neighbor  in  the  direction  selected  randomly.  This 
neighbor  node  computes  the  diameter  and  collecting 
nodes within that diameter and compares the location and 
ID. If the IDs are same and location is different clone node 
is  detected  and  it  starts  the  revocation  procedure. 
Otherwise, this information is forwarded to a node on the 
boundary of the circle or near to the edge. Then the same 
procedure is repeated until it finds the clone. 
The proposed protocol steps are given below. 
 
Input: Encrypted Message with ID, Location and time 
Output: Detection of Clone Nodes 
Step1:  Source  node  a  encrypts  the  message  with  ID, 
Location and time using RSA algorithm. 
Step2:  This  encrypted  message  is  sent  to  a  neighbor 
node  which  is  randomly  selected  based on  the 
direction.  
Step3:  The neighbor node when receives the message, 
decrypt  it  using  RSA  algorithm  and  check  for 
authorization of the source. 
Step4:  If not authorized discard the message. 
Step5:  If authorized, compares the ID and Location of 
the received message with the existing one. 
Step6:  If  IDs  are  same  and  different  locations  clone 
node  is  detected  and  initiate  the  revocation 
procedure. 
Step7:  Otherwise, the neighbor node compute a diameter 
using hash function and forward the message to 
all the nodes within the diameter range. 
Step8:  All these nodes perform the comparison and start 
the  revocation  procedure  if  clone  node  is 
detected. Otherwise, the farthest neighbor node, 
a  node  diameter/2  distance  apart  in  the  same 
direction is selected as a witness node. 
Step9:  This witness node repeat the protocol from Step 
2 to Step 8. 
 
X-RED  is  executed  in  frequent  intervals  of  time. 
Every run of the protocol consists of eight steps. In the 
first step, source node digitally signs its message-ID and 
geographic  location  and  forwards  it  to  the  farthest 
neighbor in the randomly selected direction. When the 
neighbor receives the message, it executes Step 2 to Step 
7. The neighbor node computes the diameter and within 
the  circular  area  from  all  nodes  the  location  claim  is 
collected  and  compared.  If  there  is  no  clone  find  a 
witness node is selected as given in Step 8. X-RED does Geetha, C. and M. Ramakrishnan / Journal of Computer Science 10 (10): 1900-1907, 2014 
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not send message to the specific ID. A message sent to a 
node  that  is  not  available  in  the  network  would  be 
discarded;  nodes  deployed  after  the  initial  network 
deployment are not selected as witnesses because need to 
update all the nodes. 
The Step 1 encrypts a message (claim) and forwards 
it to the randomly selected neighbor. Generally message 
consists  of  time,  ID  and  location  of  the  source  node. 
Each  Neighbor  receives  the  message  performs  the 
following steps: 
 
·  Verifies the received message for its authentication and 
·  Check the message for its freshness 
 
For every valid message that passes this step, the 
possible witness node extracts the ID and location. If 
is  the  first  message  contains  this  ID,  then  the  node 
simply  stores  the  message.  Otherwise,  compute  the 
diameter  and  collect  all  neighbor  nodes  information 
within that diameter. 
If another node with same ID as a source within the 
diameter has been present, the node checks if the new 
claim is having different location information than the 
one stored in memory for this same ID. So the witness 
node triggers a revocation procedure for the ID-the two 
signed  claims  having  same  ID  and  different  location 
information are the proof of cloning. 
Here is an example of a run of the protocol. Assume 
that  the  adversary  clones  identity    a  and  assigns  this 
identity to nodes a and a′. These two nodes are placed in 
two different network locations:  1 and  2, respectively. 
During an X-RED iteration, the nodes a and a′ have to 
broadcast the same ID, but different location claims ( 1 
and   2).  Both  a  and  a′  starts  sending  the  location 
information <IDa,  1> and <IDa’,  2> respectively to their 
neighbors  in  a  randomly  selected  direction.  Now  each 
neighbor  dynamically  computes  the  diameter.  Within 
that  diameter  area  all  the  nodes  will  receive  this 
information. But a node on the boundary or near to the 
boundary will be considered as witness node (w). The 
same procedure is repeated and at the same time a′ will 
also execute the same protocol. The same w will receive 
the  claim  from  a  and  a′  and  then  finds  the  clone  and 
trigger the revocation procedure.  
6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
In  this  section,  we  show  that  X-RED  meets  the 
following  requirements:  Unaware  of  ID  and  location 
information; less storage overhead and high clone attacks 
detection probability. Each node computes the direction 
randomly,  only  the  ID  and  location  information  of 
direct  neighbors  are  stored  in  each  node.  Only  the 
witness  node  is  having  the  ability  of  forwarding  the 
encrypted message to next level of nodes. So storage 
overhead  is  less.  The  time  sent  with  the  encrypted 
message  proves  the  freshness  of  the  message.  Every 
time the comparison is performed with set of neighbor 
nodes and so detection probability is very high. 
We further compare X-RED with RED and LSM and 
show that X-RED outperforms both RED and LSM in 
several ways. The X-RED protocol is simulated in NS2. 
In the following simulation, we fixed   = 1,000 nodes in 
the network and initially we set communication radius as 
0.1 (Bettstetter, 2002; Di Pietro et al., 2004). To test the 
protocols, we assume that there are two nodes with the 
same ID in the network. 
The  message  is  transmitted  from  both  original 
source  sensor  node  a  and  the  clone  node  a
’.  The 
witness  node  is  having  the  capability  of  forwarding 
the  encrypted  message  to  the  next  node  which  is 
selected randomly in a direction. 
The  probability  that  a  particular  node  becomes  a 
witness node is Pwitness = 1/m, where m is the number of 
nodes  for  which  l  ≤  d  ≤  l+є  (є  is  a  small  value)  l-
diameter  randomly  calculated  and  d-distance  between 
neighbor and witness. 
The  following  Table  2  shows  overheads  while 
message transmission and signature check. The Table 3 
shows the communication cost and detection probability 
of various protocols.  
Figure 3 shows the number of messages that are stored 
by  each  node  in  X-RED,  LSM  and  RED.  X-axis 
represents number of messages stored by sensor nodes and 
Y-axis represents % of the nodes stores fixed number of 
messages.  The  graph  is  obtained  by  plotting  the  values 
taken  from  the  results  of  more  than  1000  simulations. 
Note that for LSM (Cho et al., 2013), some nodes could 
require  to  store  as  many  as  200  messages.  Our 
experiments show that LSM requires some 60 messages 
are stored by 1.9% nodes, some 40 to 59 messages are 
stored  by  7.6%  nodes  and  27.5%  of  the  nodes  store 
messages  between  20  and  39.  63%  of  the  nodes  are 
required to store less than 20 messages. In RED, only a 
very  less  number  of  the  nodes  store  more  than  10 
messages (Conti et al., 2011). As for X_RED, only few 
nodes  require  to  store  more  than  5  messages,  which  is 
relatively less than RED (0.001) percent. The sensor nodes 
which store the location claim message is very less. In the 
proposed protocol only the witness nodes are having the 
capacity  of  storage.  In  every  iteration,  the  farthest 
neighbor in the selected direction is selected as witness. Geetha, C. and M. Ramakrishnan / Journal of Computer Science 10 (10): 1900-1907, 2014 
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Fig. 3. Messages stored in sensor nodes in LSM, RED and X-RED 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Detection probability for LSM, RED and X-RED 
 
Table 2. Comparison of overheads of LSM, RED and X-RED 
Protocol  Communication cost (messages sent and received)  Signature check 
LSM  O(g.p.d.√n)  O(g.p.d.√n) 
RED  O(g.p.d.√n)  O(g.p.d) 
X-RED  O(g.p.d.√n) (g = 1)  O(g.p.d) (g = 1) 
 
Table 3. Comparison of communication overhead and detection probability 
  LSM    RED    X-RED 
  ---------------------------------  ----------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
Iterations  CO  DP  CO  DP  CO  DP 
5  40  0.35  36  0.840  3.5  0.880 
10  20  0.33  10  0.830  7.5  0.870 
15  4  0.25  2  0.814  2.0  0.854 
20  4  0.72  2  0.130  0.0  0.792 
CO-Communication Overhead: DP-Detection Probability Geetha, C. and M. Ramakrishnan / Journal of Computer Science 10 (10): 1900-1907, 2014 
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Figure 4 shows the detection probability in the Y-
axis and iterations in the X-axis. The graph is plotted for 
about  200  iterations.  The  values  were  taken  from  the 
results  obtained  for  more  than  50  network  topology. 
Each single deployment was evaluated for X-RED, LSM 
and the RED protocol. For all the iterations, the X-RED 
protocol shows high probability of detecting clones than 
RED and LSM. From the 1st to the 50th iteration, LSM 
shows  probability  detection  of  about  35%,  while  this 
probability is 84% for the RED protocol (Conti et al., 
2007). However, X_RED shows probability detection of 
about 85%. When the number of iterations increases, it 
takes the time to find the clone node and so the detection 
probability gradually decreases. When compared to the 
LSM  a  mass  increment  in  detection  probability  and 
compared to RED a slight difference is there but during 
all iterations X-RED is showing the efficiency. 
6.1. Analysis of Network with Malicious Nodes 
Here we analyze the replica detection probability 
during a number of continuous iterations. We assume 
that  the  malicious  node  has  cloned  a  node  and  is 
already  controlling  a  set  of  nodes.  There  is  no 
mechanism  for  preventing  packet  dropping  and  so 
malicious  nodes  when  it  becomes  witness  node  will 
stop forwarding claim messages. 
In RED protocol (Zhu et al., 2007), the probability 
that at least one malicious node is present in the two 
path is Equation 1: 
 
2
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-  
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In X-RED, from both a and a′ the claim message is 
sent to one neighbor node and then to witness node. On 
the path if there are l nodes, both the paths contain 2l 
nodes. The probability that at least one malicious node is 
present in the two paths is Equation 2: 
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n = the number of sensor nodes,  
l  = the number of nodes on the path.  
Except the two source nodes (original and clone), all 
the other nodes can be the malicious nodes. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this study, three protocols namely LSM, RED and 
X-RED were discussed for detecting the clone attacks. In 
LSM, the detection probability is very less and there is 
an enormous improvement in RED and in X-RED it is 
88%.  The  proposed  X-RED  protocol  is  the  major 
contribution  of  this  research  and  this  study  is  used  to 
detect  node  replication  attacks  and  analyzing  the 
performance  of  all  the  three  protocols.  During 
simulation,  once  in  every  five  iterations  the  detection 
probability  and  communication  overhead  is  calculated 
and the same is plotted in the graph. 
The  extensive  simulation  result  shows  that  the  X-
RED protocol is highly efficient in detection probability 
than  the  existing  protocols  discussed  in  the  literature. 
The  storage  overhead  is  evenly  distributed  among  the 
nodes. The encrypted message is not broadcasted to all 
other  nodes  deployed  in  the  network.  Only  very  few 
nodes need to store the messages and so communication 
overhead is reduced. The main advantage of the protocol 
is  dynamically  compute  the  direction  of  the  neighbor 
node, compute the diameter of the area in which all the 
nodes receive the claim information using hash function 
and to find the farthest neighbor every time. There is no 
static  assumption  for  the  witness  node.  This  study  is 
applied on static wireless sensor network and this can be 
extended for mobile wireless sensor network in future. 
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